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the 
politics of urban development  
Abstract 
The traditional relationship between politics and policy-making has been challenged in recent 
years, highlighting how policy itself can generate political action (Hajer, 2003). This raises 
questions about how conflict produced or mediated through the policy process is managed, 
-political settleme
fundamental politico-
debate. This paper argues that such displacement generates its own distinctive politico-
managerial logic. Drawing on the discourses and practices of planning reform in England it is 
suggested that ongoing systemic reform might be understood as a product of a politics of 
displacement that seeks to cover over the causes of the antagonism generated by the logic of 
urban development. Tracing this logic through the policy process, it further suggests that 
displacement has a range of under-examined effects on local democracy and the legitimacy of 
local government.  
Keywords
governance 
Introduction 
This paper sets out to explore the relationship between politics and policy-making in the light 
of recent debates about post-politics (Swyngedouw, 2007) and the uses of land-use planning 
as a form of post-political governance (Allmendinger and Haughton 2010; Metzger, 2011). It 
starts by analysing the rhetoric of planning reform in England during the last ten years, 
suggesting that the recurrence of reform under successive governments can be seen as a 
displacement of the fundamental political conflict generated by urban development. The 
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paper then goes on, through a case study of planning for housing in the south east of England, 
to further trace this politics of displacement and the range of different effects and responses it 
generates. Overall, further evidence is provided of the ways in which policy reform and the 
policy process are used as mechanisms for defusing and managing the conflict generated by 
controversial issues such as urban development. Further to this, however, the paper argues 
that significant analytical attention should be paid to the work required to repress such 
conflict, focusing on the range of often unappreciated, negative effects this may have on local 
democracy and the legitimacy of local government, and highlighting the ongoing and 
cumulative costs of the attempt to sustain a post-political settlement.   
Creating he rhetoric of planning reform and the displacement 
of politics  
Whilst in opposition, the Conservative Party claimed that the then New Labour Government 
1 a), 
fostering conflict around urban development through land-use planning reforms that 
centralised control and denied power to local people. In response then shadow minister for 
housing Grant Shapps promised that they would empower local people to take greater control 
 of 
). At the time of writing, as part of a governing coalition with 
the Liberal Democrats, they are introducing planning reforms that they claim will fulfil this 
the landscape of English governance by dispersing power away from the state into civil 
society (Cameron, 2010). Putting aside the coherence or otherwise of the Big Society or 
                                                          
1 
and typically self-  
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localism2
controversy new housing development frequently generates as central to the framing of 
 
The planning system in England has long been charged with bringing forward the levels of 
new development that successive governments have deemed necessary, amidst frequently 
expressed concerns that excessively restrictive land-use policies are acting as a brake on 
growth and economic competitiveness (e.g. Barker, 2006). However, this involves managing 
the levels of antagonism generated by this development, and particularly the reality of 
concerted opposition in many of those parts of the country (particularly the south-east) where 
growth pressures are highest, and increased levels of development are seen as critical to 
(restoring) economic growth. The claim that the solution to this rests in the empowerment of 
square the circle between commitment to more collaborative forms of policy-making  where 
participation is now seen as crucial for the legitimation of planning decisions - and the reality 
of increasingly intractable opposition to development.  
provide an exemplary articulation of this, constructing a narrative through which they claim 
to be able to transcend the development/ participation knot and address the problem of 
planning been 
responsible for generating much of this antagonism, turning the fundamentally reasonable 
citizens of middle England into NIMBYs who are justifiably opposed to development 
imposed from above without their consent. The heavy-handed central state is therefore 
                                                          
2 Both terms have been adopted as key policy ideas or frames by the Coalition, however, their substance remains 
unclear. Such framing ideas have been identified as increasingly fluid in recent years, subject to abandonment 
once they are challenged or their political value has been outlived (and as discussed below the idea of localism 
has been challenged in relation to planning). In this context it seems advisable to avoid attributing any essential 
character to them.  
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responsible for alienating people and contributing to the development of undesirable 
characteristics within the population.   
The construction of a narrative that lays the blame for the development/participation knot in 
oach to government does a considerable amount of political 
and ideological work (see Finlayson, 2009), not least in positioning planning reform as a 
necessary and distinct response to the failures of the previous government. However, it also 
obscures important continuities with reform dynamics under New Labour. Indeed, it is 
(Conservative Party, 2009) closely mirrors that which motivated wide-ranging reform under 
New Labour (see e.g. DTLR, 2001). Both describe a system that is bureaucratic and 
inefficient and that thereby causes considerable discontent amongst both affected 
communities, and business and developer interests. Each therefore identifies the 
development/ participation knot as being close to the crux of the problem of planning. 
Moreover, each also claims that they can identify and address the causes of this 
dissatisfaction through reform that will lead to the creation of a system able to achieve a 
range of desirable sounding outcomes for all of its users, including for example: sustainable 
development; efficient decision-making; a strong economy; successful democracy; and 
empowered citizens.  
Underpinning governmental rhetoric in both cases therefore is an idealisation of the way in 
which the system should perform were it to operate properly. For both this requires a 
resolution of the conflict represented by the development/ participation knot that will 
empower citizens, whilst also freeing up development; restoring the 
between communities and development, and thereby (re)creating a consensual reality3. In the 
                                                          
3 The rhetoric of planning reform here has intersected with a wider Conservative/ Coalition idealisation of the 
underlying organic order that has been destroyed by too much central state intervention (see Raban, 2009). 
6 
 
case of Shapps, the narrative is completed through the rolling back of the heavy-handed state 
and its replacement by a new governmental rationality that reshapes behaviour by offering 
citizens economic incentives to accept development4. Under New Labour, meanwhile, in 
between development and participation was at times simply denied. For example, Lord 
Falconer, as the minister responsible, gave evidence to the Select Committee inquiry into the 
2001 Green Paper on planning reform in which he refused to accept that there was any 
necessary contradiction between speeding up decisions in the interests of business and 
economic development, and increasing levels of public participation in the process. For both 
New Labour and the Coalition then, systemic planning reform provides a means of resolving 
the development/ participation knot, allowing for the reconciliation of development and 
 a rhetorical move that 
constructs opposition to development as a perverse effect of flaws in the existing planning 
system that can be corrected through reform. 
Rhetorically this allows the contradiction between development and participation to be 
resolved, and government to claim to pursue both goals for the planning system through 
reform: responding to continued criticisms of planning from pro-development interests within 
and around government, whilst also appealing to key electoral constituencies and maintaining 
a commitment to collaborative processes. However, concerns about the impacts of sustained 
growth on the environment and quality of life in the south-east of England might suggest a 
different interpretation where conflict emanates from citizens acting not just in response to 
 
this may be the response of the good citizen as rational economic actor, see e.g. Watson, 
                                                          
4 Though it is necessary to note the contradiction between the continued use of central government powers to 
 and the claim that reform will empower people to shape their own 
 
7 
 
2009), but out of a more complex set of anxieties about the negative consequences of 
continued development. In this way the citizen-subjectivities generated can be understood as 
a complex response to the contradictory spatial logic of urban development itself, with 
planning an issue which reveals the ways in which the supposed beneficiaries of continued 
economic growth often feel threatened by it. In these terms, the continuing problematisation 
of the planning system might be seen as a means of displacing more fundamental questions 
about both the sustainability of this growth model, and the possibility of further sustained 
development (Gunder and Hillier, 2009, chapter 8), with the system itself, rather than the 
 
The paper takes this analysis of the rhetoric of planning reform as a starting point, viewing 
the motor of ongoing change as an expression of governmental inability to confront the 
politics generated by urban development. In this context the labelling of certain citizen-
subjectivities as desirable (homebuilder) or undesirable (NIMBY) can be seen as one strategy 
through which governments have sought to manage politically difficult conflict (cf. 
Burningham, 2000). The argument therefore opens up wider concerns about the relationship 
between politics and policy-making, and the range of mechanisms available to governments 
to manage conflict produced or mediated through the policy process. It is to these 
mechanisms that the rest of the paper now turns. The next section reviews recent debates 
about the uses of policy to stabilise the contradictions within what has been described as a 
post-political settlement (Allmendinger and Haughton 2010; Metzger, 2011; Swyngedouw, 
2007). This provides a conceptual framework through which the subsequent case study is 
then assessed. Overall, the paper argues that theories of post-political policy-making, 
premised on the use of policy to displace politics, need to be sensitive to the full range of 
different effects that the repression of conflict may generate.   
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Politics and the management of conflict in the policy process: the case of planning for 
housing in England 
In recent years, the traditional relationship between politics and policy-making has been 
contested, questioning the assumption that policy-making and implementation follow from 
political decision-making. Hajer (2003) for example suggests policy-making is itself 
generative of politics, with citizens emerging as subjects in response to particular policy 
initiatives. In land-use terms this often happens late in the process, only after their local 
impacts become apparent. This leads him to suggest that policy processes need to be opened 
-of-
page 110). In similar terms Owens and Cowell (2011) argue that conflict in 
the implementation of policy, symbolised by public inquiries in the planning process, can 
which significant challenges to policy discourses can be raised. 
However, whilst the legitimacy of public participation has become an unassailable pillar of 
the planning system and fostering more collaborative modes of policy-making an explicit 
goal, the legitimacy of such end-of-pipe challenges to planning policy has often been resisted 
by governments. This has typically been framed through frustration at the delays they can 
cause to economically important decisions. This suggests the ambivalent nature of the 
relationship between politics and policy-making. The planning process both produces and 
mediates politics and conflict, and can be used to either open up or close down spaces in 
which such antagonism can be articulated as political resistance (Metzger, 2011). This is, of 
course, not a new phenomenon. The use of the policy process to manage or frame what issues 
Planning too has long stood accused of acting as a mechanism for depoliticisation, masking 
value-based decisions in rational-technical or professional justifications as a means of 
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defusing conflict and imposing development without fully examining its social or 
environmental consequences (e.g. Reade, 1987; Hague, 1984). The rational legal logic of the 
policy process, moreover, tends to treat the articulation of opposition as an unhealthy 
problem to be managed out of the process (Pløger, 2004), necessitating the use of a range of 
).    
The case of planning for housing in England provides an example of some of the mechanisms 
through which governments have sought to manage the end-of-pipe conflicts that 
development frequently generates. The controversial nature of housing development has 
worked against the emergence of effective local governance or participatory practices in 
many places, relying instead on the continued exercise of the top-down powers of central 
government to prescribe the levels of housing provision required in local development plans 
(Cowell and Murdoch, 1999; Murdoch and Abram, 2002). Though there has been some 
attempt to justify this in terms of an overriding national interest in ensuring economic growth, 
or the provision of affordable housing, central government has nonetheless sought to pursue a 
range of strategies that have limited the spaces and forms of contestation available. Aside 
from directing development towards areas where resistance is less marked (which is 
increasingly difficult within a political economy that seeks to prime key spatial assets), the 
most notable of these has involved transposing the political issues raised into a process of 
rational-technical argumentation over how much housing is needed in different parts of the 
country. This has narrowed the scope for contesting development beyond the terms of the 
accept, allowing central government to exercise power at a distance, insulated to some extent 
from the conflict generated (Murdoch and Abram, 2002; Vigar et al, 2000). At the same time 
this has therefore created an attendant politics of blame as responsibility for housing 
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allocations is passed between different layers of government. Whilst this may represent a 
pragmatic means of mediating inevitable tensions over difficult decisions, it also represents a 
technocratic fix that seeks to contain conflict, allowing only limited space for political 
challenge (Vigar et al, 2000). However, the centrality of housing as an issue within recurring 
planning reform initiatives since the early 2000s suggests that the housing numbers game has 
increasingly struggled to provide a stable basis for governing by containing antagonism and 
guaranteeing desirable levels of development (cf. Vigar et al, 2000). 
-political 
entailing a 
managerial approach to government that seeks to defuse conflict, asserting consensus, and 
shutting out questions that raise more fundamental challenges to the logic of market-driven 
politics (Swyngedouw, 2007; Zizek, 2006; Mouffe, 2005). Within the contemporary post-
political consensus (Swyngedouw, 2007), it is possible to see planning as having been tasked 
with defusing the conflict generated by an unquestioned commitment to economic growth 
through promises of more integrative or participatory policy-making (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2010). This suggests that the long-standing role of the policy process as a 
mechanism for managing conflict, rather than for opening up political spaces, may have been 
enrolled as a mechanism of post-political conflict management  working to stabilise the 
contradictions within a hegemonic settlement.  
The logic of the post-political condition suggests, however, that where political antagonism is 
suppressed or denied it is likely to re-appear in other arenas, staged as different forms of 
protest. In this way, it is necessary to see any putative post-political consensus as premised on 
the displacement of fundamental political questions, but therefore as likely to generate its 
own micro-politics of displacement. For radical commentators suppressed conflict is likely to 
surface in forms of direct action (Swyngedouw, 2007). However, conflict that is channelled 
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into or generated through the policy process may also re-appear in other ways. Owens and 
Cowell (2011) suggest the metaphor of air in a balloon, where squeezing one end increases 
pressure at the other. Whilst Allmendinger and Haughton (2010) suggest that the regulatory 
spaces of development control within the planning system offer multiple different points of 
resistance to dominant logics of growth. Metzger (2011) further points out that displaced 
political energies may generate new political arenas and forms of politics that might enrichen 
democratic debate (though it should equally be noted that such new forms of politics may 
also surface in a range of less attractive ways [Owens and Cowell, 2010]). 
In addition, however, the effects of the displacement of politics, and the managerial work 
required to repress conflict, may not only prove disruptive to the stability of particular policy 
discourses (as in the case of the housing numbers game), or to formal political spaces.  A 
range of research also suggests that displaced antagonism and the social anxieties that it 
stems from are likely to be projected onto, and internalised within the state agencies charged 
with implementing policy (Lipsky, 1980; Hoggett, 2006, 2010; Fotaki, 2010). This suggests 
that there may be further, often under-appreciated ramifications of a politics of displacement 
that have significant implications for understanding the roles of public organisations and both 
elected and unelected officials. The paper now moves to the local level to explore these issues 
through the experiences of one local planning authority charged with managing the high 
levels of conflict generated by housing development. In doing so it seeks to trace some of 
 complex 
range of impacts generated by a politics of displacement, and the work required to sustain a 
post-political settlement through the policy process. 
Local planning cultures in the face of conflict: thick skins and thin governance 
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Within a hierarchical policy system one of the effects of a politics of displacement is that 
conflicts can be passed down through the system to be dealt with at lower levels. As Lipsky 
(1980, page 41; Hoggett, 2005, page 
conflict resolution is to pass on intractable conflicts for resolution (or continued irresolution) 
or housing the effects of government 
projecting idealised resolutions of the development/participation knot onto local governance 
cultures is to pass responsibility back to the sites where such conflict is most fiercely felt and 
contested, and its political resolution most difficult (Vigar et al, 2000). In the rest of the 
politics of conflict over urban development, the paper explores the effects of this on local 
government planning practice and particularly its impacts on the organisational and 
governance cultures through which development is mediated.  
The case study was conducted as part of a wider project that sought to understand New 
 they were influencing local planning cultures in England. 
Wokingham Borough Council (WBC) in the County of Berkshire was selected as a case 
study because it characterised what the Town and Country Planning Association (2001) has 
become a key local political issue (indeed, the local civic society revels in the label, extolling 
citizens to embrace NIMBY-ism as a symbol of their concern for the area). As a case WBC 
therefore exemplified many of the qualities the then government had sought to problematise 
in framing the need for planning reform, but also provided a context within which to explore 
how reform responded to political conflict over development.  The case study involved a 
series of twelve interviews with planners working in plan production and development 
management, senior executive officers including the chief executive and heads of other 
services, and local politicians. This combination of interviewees was intended to allow an in-
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depth exploration of the local planning culture and its operation. Interviews were further 
supplemented by analysis of a wide range of local policy documents and local press reports, 
and observation of public meetings. Additional follow up interviews with key contacts in the 
planning department were also conducted to consider how work was progressing, this meant 
that the study was able to follow events over a period of a year and half between 2006 and 
mid-2008. 
Located adjacent to the fast growing town of Reading, within the M4 corridor and the much 
-tech and knowledge based economic development to the 
west of London, Wokingham is in the heart of the economically dynamic and affluent south-
east (Short et al, 1987; Wokingham District Council, 2002). The Borough is characterised by 
nationally and regionally low unemployment rates, and high rates of average income, car 
ownership and educational attainment (Wokingham Borough Council, 2008). This picture of 
 was reinforced by the results of polls by the Halifax Building Society and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland that described the Borough as amongst the best places to live in the UK in 
2007 (Tinker, 2007)5.  Such prosperity brings with it distinct advantages, but also particular 
challenges: the then south-east regional plan6, for example, suggested the need to carefully 
appeal, suggesting an understanding that growth has ca
infrastructure. 
Due to its privileged location, the Borough and surrounding areas have been subject to 
enormous growth pressures in the last forty years. Between 1971 and 2001 it witnessed a 
50% increase in population and an 85% increase in households. This was sustained by the 
                                                          
5 The case study was conducted before the full implications of the current economic crisis had become apparent 
 
6 The coalition government has made abolition of the regional level of planning a particular priority. Due to 
legal challenges, at the time of writing this has not yet happened but is a key part of emerging legislation. 
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2008). However, growth has also been subject to long-standing local opposition, with an 
articulate and educated population regularly opposed to and willing to mobilise against 
further development (e.g. Short et al, 1987). As a result the accommodation of housing 
development has long been central to local politics in a pattern similar to that witnessed in 
other parts of the region (Short et al, 1987; Murdoch and Abram, 2002), indeed local 
politicians suggested in interview that the political culture of Wokingham was defined by 
the threat of large housing numbers from the government  
The political profile of development means that planning issues are subject to high levels of 
scrutiny from the council, local press and population. This creates a political and policy 
climate, within which local politicians and officers seek to pursue a range of strategies that 
will allow them to manage the antagonism generated by development. Below some of the key 
dimensions of this antagonistic political culture are explored under the post-2004 planning 
regime created by New Labour. These demonstrate the politics of displacement at the local 
level, their implications for policy implementation, relations within the authority and between 
the state and citizens in the putatively collaborative spaces of the planning system.  
Opposition, othering and the management of blame 
During the late 2000s when the case study was conducted WBC was controlled by a 
Conservative administration with a strong electoral majority. In large part this represented a 
legacy of the decision by the Liberal Democrats to agree to the levels of housing proposed in 
the revision of the then county-wide Berkshire structure plan in 2005. By drawing on a 
discourse of opposition to growth the Conservatives were able to take a firm grip on the 
council. Their administration subsequently refused to accept the allocation of housing for the 
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area, forcing the Secretary of State to intervene to impose the numbers, but allowing the 
 
Housing targets were again at the centre of controversy over the production of a core strategy 
for Wokingham in 2006-8 (the central element of the new system of local plan-making 
introduced in 2004). This was particularly focused around the implications of political 
opposition to the then emerging South East Plan (SEP) which was to replace the structure 
plan in defining strategic policy, including housing numbers. The SEP proposed to maintain 
the share of housing for each Berkshire authority established under the previous system.  This 
allocation from 523 to 623 houses a year. The council 
meanwhile maintained that the figure should be set at 320, the projected capacity on 
previously developed land within Wokingham. The fact that neighbouring Reading had 
consistently exceeded its housing 
to deliver 10% above their SEP targets as part of a government drive to deliver more housing, 
added to a sense of injustice about the allocations. The imposition of these figures by an 
unelected regional body, meanwhile, stoked further indignation. 
As a result the leader of the council, Frank Browne, wrote to every household in the district 
in October 2005 inviting them to respond to a questionnaire. This yielded some 18, 000 
responses, a 31.8% response rate. A further letter was sent in May, 2006 urging residents to 
make their opposition to the allocation for the district known to the panel of inspectors 
that this opposition rested on two key principles: the high levels of growth seen in the last 
infrastructure. This provided the council with a strong mandate to argue for lower numbers 
and was further backed up by research commissioned from the consultancy Ove Arup in 2004 
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that suggested there was a requirement for some £818 million in infrastructure investment to 
accommodate growth over the life of the proposed SEP.  
The commitment of resources to opposing housing numbers and mobilising the citizens of the 
Borough to campaign against the regional planning process shows the politics of resistance at 
work in Wokingham - a central tactic in the local politics of growth management (Short et al, 
justly incorporated elsewhere in the country (Wokingham District Council, 2005), this 
discourse was further reinforced through appeals to the environmental qualities of the area, 
and fears that its quality of life (and therefore success) may be endangered by continued 
development. Officers were licensed to explore a wide range of arguments that could be used 
to argue against the logic of the SEP.   
Resistance to growth was politically popular, and the administration was successful in 
galvanising strong local participation to their cause in what could be considered a powerful 
mobilisation of local political energies. However, this discourse was also unlikely to succeed 
in re-shaping the regional agenda. If, when they were first elected in 1997, New Labour had 
won a share of south-eastern shire county seats in parliament, making the politics of 
enforcing housing development a potentially difficult issue (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-
Jones, 2000), by the mid-late 2000s ministers had made it clear that increasing housing 
nomy/ collaborative policy-
 non-negotiable policy 
priorities on which local government was expected to act, regardless of local political 
considerations. In this way the government had come to rely on the housing numbers game to 
enforce development in the face of resistance, with ministers constructing opposition to 
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house-building as an unacceptable form of NIMBY-ism that threatened the stability of the 
economy, and denied opportunity to future generations by driving up prices and making 
housing increasingly unaffordable (e.g. Cooper, 2005). 
The discourse of opposition was therefore only effective in fairly limited terms. It succeeded 
in displacing local political conflict, insulating the ruling conservative administration from 
the electoral consequences of accepting growth. The rescaling of plan-making within the new 
planning system facilitated this by shifting conflict and blame to the regional level, and 
central government (who ultimately determined the allocations in the regional plans). 
However, as the paper now goes on to describe, this was a short term displacement that 
required careful management of the political fall-out when housing numbers came back from 
the regional level and moved through to the level of development control decision-making. 
Moreover, it was also a partial displacement that brought local elected members into conflict 
with planning officers. 
 
The short term nature of the strategy of opposition was particularly apparent to officers and 
managers within the authority who were under pressure from GOSE to produce a core 
strategy that would provide a framework for delivering housing in the Borough, and were 
acutely conscious that opposition was unlikely to succeed and would do little to increase 
course and the housing numbers had been largely determined this became a problem that the 
ruling administration also accepted it needed to manage. It was clear that they would need to 
accept the levels of growth the government had determined, and that they needed to shift 
from a discourse of opposition to one of reluctantly managing growth (cf. Short et al, 1987), 
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this was facilitated by Frank Browne standing down as leader of the council before the local 
elections of that year. 
This significant change coincided with the appointment of a new chief executive who brought 
a new managerial ethos to the authority, leading to the appointment of a new management 
team that sought to improve strained relations between officers and members, but also to 
challenge the power of elected members, many of whom had developed an entrenched 
authority through long periods in office. Formal mediation processes were used to move 
beyond what were described as the negative discourses defining WBC, towards a more 
positive vision of how the council could seek to shape change. Central to this was a desire for 
executive indicated a managerial challenge to the authority of traditional, elected local 
government within WBC (cf. Cochrane, 2004). 
In relation to planning policy there was a concerted effort to shift the authority towards a 
discourse of controlling growth. The new leader of the council was elected arguing that 
number one challenge
Times, 2008). Key arguments were forwarded to gain popular support for the new approach 
including the need for more affordable housing for local young people, and proposals to 
revitalise the town centre of Wokin
of their children. Senior managers meanwhile claimed that the new, positive agenda spoke for 
the silent majority of residents who were willing to accept change. 
Officers welcomed this shift as a means to develop a more positive culture, moving off 
-performing authorities, and taking advantage of the incentives 
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available to authorities that met government objectives. They saw this as a recognition of the 
Murdoch and Abram, 2002). These wider shifts within WBC therefore created space within 
which it was politically possible to make progress on the previously stalled core strategy. The 
strategy that emerged from this positioned growth as an unwelcome but unavoidable 
imposition, and sought to argue for large scale planned redevelopment areas that would 
ain more widely. This 
represented a long-standing local solution to managing growth that seemed more acceptable 
 
Officers also however, recognised this as a fragile settlement that did not necessarily reflect 
any underlying shif
form of governance, framed within WBC and in relation to governmental logics, but with 
little confidence that it commanded popular legitimacy. It involved the construction of 
diff
could not afford to live in the area) as a means of managing the spectre of opposition 
ng the 
contemporary governance, and insulating managerial decisions from the public. Politically 
the Conservative administration sought to displace blame onto central government and the 
unelected (and therefore illegitimate) regional assembly where the SEP had been produced. 
With further housing targets accepted at the plan-making level, however, attention would also 
be shifted further down to the level of implementation.  
opposition 
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It is widely understood that development becomes progressively more politicised and harder 
ns on stand-
them. At this level local opposition is also often at its most emotive as people mobilise in 
response to a perceived threat to what they value in their local area. This may be 
characterised as NIMBY-ism, however, such a pejorative label may also be unhelpful, 
masking rather than illuminating the range of different motivations, including interests, 
beliefs, emotional attachments and even unacknowledged anxieties about the future, that 
 
In Wokingham, given the unpopularity of development, public scrutiny of development 
control decision-making is extensive. The local paper, The Wokingham Times facilitates this, 
often covering controversial development in emotive fashion, for example, taking on the role 
of a community organiser by reminding readers to register their opposition to applications 
with the council before key deadlines have passed (e.g. Corbett, 2007a; 2007b).  
strain. A period of particularly marked conflict over the interpretation of national policy on 
housing density had recently resulted in the introduction of a new DC manager who had 
-
serving officers.  
brave
concerted and well-organised opposition. They felt that, in the past, politicians had often been 
needed to
21 
 
planning by appeal
resulting in a loss of control over development and high costs incurred in fighting appeal 
hearings. Recently this had led to an attempt to persuade councillors that, in the face of policy 
opposition  speaking out against sitting on their hands
against proposals. This was framed as a pragmatic response at a stage in the planning process 
where the system left little room for politics -decisions without a sound basis in planning 
policy and rationality would be subject to potentially costly appeal proceedings. However, it 
also seemed a further reflection of the growing claim to power of managerial discourses 
 
generated by development within the Borough. The same depoliticising logic was also 
reflected in a substantial increase in the proportion of applications being determined by 
officers under delegated powers rather than being voted on by councillors, providing another 
means of circumventing what was considered undue or disruptive political influence. 
Nonetheless, these developments represented a further form of displacement within the 
planning system, and a closing down of potentially politicised spaces as a response to 
antagonism that could not be easily contained within the policy process. 
Prophylactic practices: organisational and personal defences 
The previous section described how antagonism over development puts considerable pressure 
on the planning process in Wokingham. It also referred to some of the pressures that these 
issues place on relations between councillors and officers (cf. Tait and Campbell, 2000). In 
this section the paper goes on to further describe how the external pressure generated by 
opposition impacted on both the internal organisational culture of WBC, and on the spaces of 
engagement between WBC and the local population. 
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As described above, public service organisations often become containers for a range of 
wider antagonisms and anxieties that are projected onto the state and its activities (Hoggett, 
2006; 2010). Public officials are therefore required to manage relations with the public that 
are overdetermined by different meanings and expectations. This frequently leads to the 
emerge
to deal with what Lipsky (1980, page 152; also Hoggett, 2006, page 186; cf. Fotaki, 2010) 
-level work normally  
In Wokingham where planning was understood as a thin form of governance that often 
operated against popular wishes, such coping devices were both a resource and a resort for 
planners as they sought to respond to the perpetual return of the repressed conflict generated 
by development. The relationship between planners and the public was marked by a deep 
ambivalence on both sides: for citizens who consistently voted against public intervention 
and viewed the council with suspicion, but who also sought strict public control of 
development activity; and for planners, who were committed to the principle of public 
but who also saw new housing as both inevitable and necessary and had to confront the 
of having faced angry citizens, and the story of one consultation event in which the 
assembled citizens had to be talked out of walking out en masse was frequently referred to. 
The Wokingham Times was a potent symbol of this difficult relationship, regularly directing 
fears over development into questioning of council decision-making, with frequent recourse 
against development. 
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 coping 
devices through which the planners sought to safely manage relations with the public - could 
between planners and citizens, insulating both professional decisions and personal feelings 
against hostility. For the planners these devices played an important role in helping to sustain 
organisational and personal commitments in the face of the antagonism that was often 
directed towards them. These included:  
 Most striki
to appeal to it (cf. Newman and Clarke, 2009). Whilst professing to understand why 
residents objected to development, the planners also sought to present this opposition 
as often narrowly focused NIMBY-ism that should be dismissed. Appeal was 
frequently made to the more reasonable silent majority who did not participate in 
consultation exercises, or to future generations whose interests the planners had to 
represent  rather than tho
residents who did respond to policy consultations). Sometimes the public were also 
constructed as incapable of acting in their own best interests, or as hypocritical, or 
ignorant of the needs of the local area and the pressures the planning system imposed. 
This allowed an appeal to a higher wisdom, beyond immediate self-interest to justify 
working against local sentiment.  
 acterised 
relations between planning and the local population. This included: the wider crisis of 
public services and negative public perception of the council; central government and 
 the complexity 
of the recently reformed planning system that naively presumed the possibility of 
reaching a consensus with local communities through consultation.  The fact that 
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these factors were beyond their control allowed planners to distance themselves from 
 
 
the job that although frustrating could not be influenced and so had to be accepted  
another means of distancing personal commitments from likely outcomes. This also 
helped to construct a shared, embattled identity across the council that emphasised 
how good intentions were frequently not understood outside the council offices, 
contributing to an understanding of planners as part of a wider public sector 
appreciated.  
 For those individuals who identified particularly strongly with the principle of 
participation it was sometimes possible to select specific tasks that allowed this 
identification to be expressed. For one senior member of the team this involved 
working with local people in the construction of village design guides. Another junior 
officer meanwhile devoted considerably more time than others to dealing with queries 
from the public desk as a means of fulfilling an increasingly ambivalent commitment 
to public service.  
Whilst these defensive responses can be understood as coping devices, they also operated as 
mechanisms of control, allowing planners to justify their interventions in the face of conflict7. 
In this regard they interacted with the more traditional systemic defences that the planning 
system provided for the planners. These included the strict delimitation of the terms on which 
consultation events and responses would and would not be considered relevant  often 
                                                          
7 For example, s ) who viewed 
can be viewed as 
long-standing tactics, working both as coping mechanisms and as potentially questionable claims to power. 
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densely argued in legislative and policy detail. This represented a retreat into a longer 
standing bureaucratic role, some way distant from the ideal of the collaborative planner 
(Healey, 2006), but was a further resource that allowed planners to defend themselves against 
difficult exchanges, and demands that they were obliged to refuse. Whilst officers accepted 
this as part of their working reality, all also admitted to a sense of frustration at the effective 
structuring of their work and relations with the public by conflict that they felt powerless to 
mediate. 
Below the implications of this case study are considered in the context of both the 
construction of planning reform and the development/participation knot, before the paper 
concludes with a wider consideration of what this suggests about how politically and 
ideologically intractable conflict is managed through the policy process, and as part of a 
putative post-political settlement. 
Assessing the role of the state in managing conflict over urban development 
The case study shows the experience of one local planning authority in the south-east of 
England seeking to manage the particularly intense antagonism generated by new housing 
development. As such it shows a politics of displacement at work as local politicians and 
officers sought to manage conflict that central government had refused to accept as 
legitimate, or acknowledge as a factor influencing the implementation of planning policy, and 
consequences of this game to be further displaced. Ultimately this was facilitated by the 
power of managerialism within contemporary local government to shift the internal discourse 
within the authority towards an acceptance of these rules. This solution was carefully staged 
by the ruling Conservative administration, but nonetheless represented only a thin form of 
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citizens. This promised little more than a temporary solution that would further displace this 
antagonism onto other targets  including the regional planning process; central government, 
the development control process and, significantly, the local authority itself and its relations 
with citizens. This in turn produced a range of prophylactic practices through which planners 
and other officials sought to manage the public, and to defend their decisions and personal 
commitments against the consequences of implementing policy in the face of strong local 
opposition.  
From these experiences it is possible to see something of the immediate political appeal of 
the Conservative/ Coalition targeting of further planning reform  sold as a promise to change 
the rules of the game and empower citizens to shape development. Central to this has been a 
reaction against the setting of central targets, the illegitimacy of the regional planning process 
(and perhaps implicitly 
within local government from the citizens it has claimed to serve [cf. Hoggett, 2010]). This 
agenda had clear and immediate electoral appeal in areas like Wokingham that represent the 
claim that the planning system has been responsible for creating a generation of NIMBYs 
contains an element of truth since, within the logic of the housing numbers game, all 
opposition to development prescribed at higher levels is constructed as illegitimate. In this 
context NIMBY is used by a range of actors within the policy process as a label that allows 
opposition, and the politics that this might generate, to be managed out of the process. 
orm can 
resolve the development/participation knot by transforming NIMBYs into homebuilders. The 
contradictions within this claim have already begun to emerge with the Coalition pulling back 
from promises that groups of local citizens might be empowered to determine appropriate 
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housing levels, and committing itself to an agenda that privileges growth (leading to a 
backlash from traditional Conservative supporters over proposals for a pro-growth National 
Planning Policy Framework in 2011). This suggests that the politics of planning reform 
remain fluid, however, the idea that financial incentives can act as a mechanism to transform 
citizen-subjectivities in the way the rhetoric of reform has suggested seems unlikely. It rests 
ational economic actors that elides the complex range 
of anxieties and motivations that planning produces (exposing the contradictory subjectivities 
of otherwise core beneficiaries of pro-growth politics). Moreover, it re-states the implicit 
assumption tha
can be interpreted as a search for a systemic fix that will eliminate conflict without disturbing 
the prevailing model of spatial development.  
The problematisation of the planning system itself can therefore be seen as a means of 
covering over the underlying causes of conflict with fantasies of the consensus that a fit for 
purpose planning process will create (cf. Fotaki, 2010; Gunder and Hillier, 2009). The motor 
of ongoing planning reform therefore comes to be understood as a symptom of the failure of 
the planning policy process to find a means of containing the conflict generated by new 
development; part of a post-political search for a means of defusing the complex and 
contradictory politics generated by development. However, the rescaling of planning 
decision-making within any further reform agenda is likely to produce a range of 
unanticipated outcomes as it shifts the politics of displacement and blame within the policy 
process. 
In this context, the role of local government, and the planning process, as a container for the 
antagonism and anxieties generated by development requires further exploration so that the 
costs repressed conflict imposes can be understood and opened up to examination. The case 
study suggested that these have partly been felt democratically  as the spaces of democratic 
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accountability within the planning process become carefully managed in ways that undermine 
formal channels of responsibility and accountability. However, it also explored the 
organisational and personal costs associated with managing conflict. The defensive responses 
that this provoked seemed to exacerbate rather than resolve the problematic relation between 
the state and citizens, as planners came to terms with the impossibility of consensually 
resolving the development-participation knot within a system that did not recognise it as a 
legitimate problem. Though these costs are hard to assess, there is a sense that they contribute 
to the attrition of trust in the state and the planning process as a democratically accountable 
guarantor of the public interest; and in the planning profession, which is blamed for failing to 
either deliver development, or act democratically to protect the environment. They also 
undermine the promise of collaborative governance which increasingly comes to be seen 
than of allowing them real power to shape the future of the places where they live8. 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the politics of planning reform and of planning for housing in 
England can be seen as an exemplar for exploring how states seek to manage ideologically 
and politically controversial issues through the policy process.  
Though the depoliticising potential of planning/ policy has long been recognised, the paper 
further develops the argument made elsewhere that recent planning in England has been part 
of the management of a post-political settlement which seeks to close down sites and sources 
of antagonism that might open up fundamental political questions about the sustainability of 
contemporary urban development (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010). Also in keeping with 
                                                          
8 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether such power should be given to local people, and there 
are good reasons to think any such power should be qualified by extra-local concerns (see e.g. Owens and 
Cowell, 2010). 
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others, the paper has argued that the displacement of such questions does not destroy political 
energies, but instead generates a range of displacement effects whereby conflict is channelled 
in different directions (Owens and Cowell, 2010; Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010; 
Metzger, 2011). The management of any putative post-political settlement therefore requires 
a considerable amount of political work, much of which is premised on dealing with the 
return of repressed conflict.  
Debates about post-political planning have focused critical attention on emerging forms of 
planning practice (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010), and have, more normatively,  
considered the nature of a politics of displacement and the scope for realising an agonistic 
politics within the planning process, opening up rather than closing down political questions 
and spaces (Metzger, 2011) 9. The present paper has linked the dynamics of displacement to 
the motor of continuing systemic planning reform in England. More than this, however, the 
paper has tracked the politics of displacement through the policy process, drawing attention 
to a range of mechanisms used to manage antagonism, but also to the often unexamined 
effects that the repression of conflict may have. It has highlighted the considerable pressure 
that this can put on public sector institutions, the officials charged with delivering 
development in the face of often fierce conflict, and relations between citizens and the state. 
Analysis of the displacement of politics in and through the policy process should therefore be 
sensitive to the full range of impacts repressed conflict may have on the legitimacy not just of 
policy outcomes, but of the state, and collaborative approaches to governance too; 
highlighting and examining the ongoing and cumulative costs of sustaining a post-political 
settlement.  
                                                          
9 Though as one reviewer suggested the policy process is also a realm of decision-making where closure is 
necessary. The balance between opening up, and closing down is therefore a question for debate.  
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